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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [MASS](#) [MCAP](#) [EG](#)
SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT ON RELEASE OF NIGHT VISION
DEVICES

Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Description: The USG has offered the GOE two excess defense article OSPREY Class Mine Hunter Craft under the Naval Vessels Transfer Act of 2005. The US Navy transferred these ships to the Egyptian Navy (EN) in January 2007. The following Night Vision Devices (NVDs) are routinely included with such ships:

Nomenclature	Model	Amount
Night Vision Sight	AN/TVS-5	4
Night Vision Sight, Long Range	AN/PVS-8	4
Night Vision Goggle, Single Tube	AN/PVS-7C	8
Night Vision Goggle	AN/PVS-12A	4
Pocketscope	AN/PVS-11	1
Pocketscope	AN/PVS-18	1
Gyroscopic Binoculars	AN/PVS-16	1

¶2. (SBU) NVDs are used by the U.S. Navy crew to execute night and low light operations safely and effectively. To counter the threat of mines effectively, the crew of a mine hunting ship must be able to operate safely in a suspected maritime minefield at night. NVDs would give the crews that capability.

¶3. (C) The EN requested that all releasable equipage onboard these ships (including the NVDs) be transferred with the vessels to support the modernization of the Egyptian Naval Forces, including their anti-terrorism forces, specifically in the field of mine detection and neutralization. Because the U.S. Navy decided to retain the NVDs described in para one in the US inventory, it has recommended procuring commercial-equivalent NVDs to ensure the ships' safety during night and low light operations. The Program Executive Office, Ships (US Navy) has determined that the following equipment is the correct releasable generation of night vision equipment for the vessels:

Nomenclature	Equiv Model	Total Quantity
ATN Mars6-HPTN	AN/TVS-5	4
ATN NOS10-HPTN	AN/PVS-8	4
ATN NVG7-HPTN	AN/PVS-7C	8
ATN NVM14-HPTN	AN/PVS-18	6
ATN Mars6-HPTN	AN/PVS-4	4

¶4. (C) Reason the purchaser desires the articles or services: The EN needs modern NVDs to operate effectively and safely at night. NVD capability would provide EN an

organic capability to conduct night and low-light marina/facility surveillance, coastal surveillance, low visibility navigation, collision avoidance, and search and rescue (man overboard) operations, as well as provide limited support to coalition operations/exercises and improved Egyptian security capability for U.S. vessels transiting the Suez Canal. Because the ships will operate primarily in a near land environment around numerous unlit civilian vessels, NVDS will assist in ensuring the safety of the ships and civilian crews. Egypt has procured night vision technology in the past and has met all previous requirements for security.

¶5. (C) How the articles or services would contribute to both the U.S. and the recipient's defense/security goals: These NVDS will give the EN enhanced capabilities to conduct night operations safely and improved detection in low light environments, especially when operating in a suspected maritime minefield. Egypt is a key regional ally and has received significant economic and military support from the U.S.

¶6. (C) Justification for the type and quantity of articles or services requested: The EN requests the above NVDS to give each mine hunting ship the same night vision capability they had while the ships were in U.S. Navy service.

¶7. (C) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the introduction of a new war fighting capability to the nation or region: Combatant Commander's assessment to follow separately, if required.

¶8. (C) Anticipated reactions of neighboring nations: Transfer of these NVDS would not impact the regional balance of power and should not cause negative reactions from

neighboring nations, except possibly Israel. As best as we can remember, Israel has never supported a U.S. weapons sale to Egypt; however, this sale would not reduce Israel's significant qualitative military edge.

¶9. (C) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for, safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles: The GOE has demonstrated the intent and ability to protect sensitive, classified military technology over an extended period, including over 13 years of experience with the M1A1 tank program. Egypt signed a general security of information agreement with the U.S. and, as a customer, has purchased and consistently protected the sensitive technology of other U.S. weapons systems.

¶10. (C) Training required: No training is required.

¶11. (C) Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence that might be required as a result of providing the article: We do not expect to increase the U.S. presence as a result of the proposed transfer.

¶12. (C) Source of financing and the economic impact of the proposed acquisition: The sale, if ultimately requested by Egypt and approved by the United States, would be financed from Egyptian Foreign Military Financing-Grant (FMF-G) and would not have a significant impact on Egypt's private economy.

¶13. (C) Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed acquisition: The Egyptian military has no history of human rights abuses and it supports civilian control of the military. There are no human rights considerations that preclude the release of these systems to the Egyptian military.

¶14. (C) Plan for end-use monitoring (EUM) and plan for compliance verification: OMC Egypt has a robust Golden Sentry Program. The Golden Sentry point of contact, working in close cooperation with the security assistance program officer, will review and maintain a copy of the purchaser's

physical security and accountability control plan, maintain a serial number list of all NVDs and image intensifier tubes that may be purchased, and stands ready to assist with or conduct inventories and inspections as required. Additionally, OMC Egypt is prepared to provide a written report to the U.S. Central Command, Defense Technology Security Administration, Policy Division (DTSA/PD), Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Policy, Plans and Programs Directorate (DSCA/P3), Joint Chiefs of Staff, Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (JCS/J5/WOT) and Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DOS/PM/DDTC/C) within 15 calendar days of any reported loss, theft, or unauthorized access of any Night Vision Devices listed in this offer.

¶15. (C) The operational plan for use and specific end-users to include: The EN requests permission to purchase these NVDs in support of the transfer of the mine hunters because they conduct night mine hunting, coastal patrol, and maritime security operations (including anti-terrorism and anti-smuggling operations).

¶16. (C) Description of the primary mission for the units to receive NVDs: Mine hunting, identification, and neutralization; maritime security (including anti-terrorism, anti-smuggling, security of the Suez Canal and its approaches); coalition operations; and force protection.

¶17. (C) Extent of anti-terrorist missions for the units to receive the NVDs: The Egyptian Navy has a maritime security mission.

¶18. (C) Assessment of the purchaser's capacity to afford substantially the same degree of security and accountability protection as given by the United States and willingness to accept the NVD physical security and accountability: Numerous security audits by the U.S. Government have repeatedly verified Egypt's capability to safeguard sensitive technology and materiel as well as classified military information.

¶19. (C) Additional information in support of the transfer request:

-- In December 2004, DSCA approved, under Foreign Military

Sales (FMS) Case EG-B-UUH, a GOE request for NVDs, including 106 AN/PVS-7 NVDs and ten spare image intensifier tubes. This approval followed an exception to the DOD NVD policy granted by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Technology Security Policy and Counter-proliferation (DUSD/TSP&CP), which was granted in November 2004.

--In October 2003 and July 2004, OMC Egypt hosted EUM Tiger Teams led by DSCA/P3. They inspected multiple locations and weapons systems within Egypt. These visits were very successful, and the team did not identify EUM violations.

--In December 2004, Egypt received its first shipment of Stinger missiles in conjunction with its purchase of the Avenger system. U.S. personnel have made multiple inspections of the Stinger storage facility and have not found problems. U.S. personnel have not found any discrepancies in the two missile inventories accomplished by U.S. personnel to date.

--In early 2006, DTSA approved the transfer of 12 4000C (Generation II) commercial NVDs as part of FMS Case EG-P-SBO (Egyptian Border Guard Fast Patrol Craft). Although this equipment has not yet been shipped, the GOE has provided the proper assurances to ensure security of this equipment.

¶21. (C) Country Team Recommendation: The country team recommends the U.S. Government allow the GOE to purchase the above listed NVDs in support of the transfer of the two mine hunting ships to Egypt. This is a coordinated mission position.

